FIFA and Football Agents: Regulation or Repositioning?
Deliberate Industry Sabotage or Regulatory Failure?
18th July 2025
The FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR) of 2023 were ostensibly designed to bring some order to the football agent industry. But as implementation continues to seemingly stumble from crisis to crisis, a fundamental question emerges that cuts to the heart of what may be perceived as FIFA’s true intentions.
Were FIFA ever genuinely intending to bring order to the football agent world with agent regulations, or did they want to implement something that suffocated the industry, reduced agent numbers, and potentially made football agents as a whole, largely obsolete?
This isn’t merely about regulatory incompetence; the evidence suggests a more nuanced strategy may be at play, one where FIFA, either consciously or unconsciously, positions itself to reshape and ultimately control a lucrative industry that shows no signs of disappearing.
The 'Repositioning' Theory
Before addressing what some may categorise as conspiracy theorising, it’s worth examining the evidence with clear eyes. The football agent industry is undeniably lucrative and shows no signs of disappearing. FIFA, as astute commercial operators, would hardly be naive enough to believe otherwise. However, there’s a plausible argument that certain parties connected to FIFA, both past and present, may seek to fundamentally reshape the football agent industry in ways that better serve their interests.
Whilst there is a belief here that FIFA and others may seek to make football agents obsolete, it is important to clarify that this isn’t necessarily about complete elimination of the industry, but rather about eroding the industry’s reputation and any professional standing to a point where FIFA can almost be seen as ‘riding in and rescuing it’ (if only saving the football agent industry from its self-destruction), subsequently controlling it in ways that benefit the governing body whilst potentially making most individual agents obsolete.
If this theory holds merit, then the commission cap proposed in the FFAR represents not just a regulatory tool but a strategic repositioning device. Set at levels that would challenge a vast proportion of the football agent industry, it appears almost designed to concentrate power amongst fewer, larger operators whilst marginalising individual and smaller practitioners (if not making them obsolete).
An Industry, Not (YET) a Profession
I must point out why it’s important to understand why this article refers to football agency as an ‘industry’ rather than a ‘profession‘ (a stance I have maintained for many years, which I find frustrating). The distinction is deliberate and significant. True professions are characterised by rigorous standards, robust regulation, meaningful licensing, established ethos, and consistent professionalism. Football agency, in its current form, falls considerably short of these benchmarks in a large proportion of cases.
Yes, FIFA may present that with FFAR they have reintroduced professional elements: the licence, the examination, and CPD (continued professional development). However, the examination system is seen as inconsistent and unfair, the regulations are fractured and in many cases unenforceable, and the CPD requirements are so minimal that an agent can meet their annual obligation in a few hours.
This further devalues the FIFA licence and the status of any FIFA Licensed Football Agent. Rather than elevating the field to professional standards, the current system creates the illusion of professionalism whilst maintaining the dysfunction that may well serve a broader repositioning strategy.
This seemingly flawed licensing approach creates a particularly unwelcome effect: by maintaining procedurally inconsistent and porous examination and licensing standards for FIFA Football Agents whilst projecting an illusion of professional credibility, FIFA increases the potential for market saturation with a mix of competent practitioners alongside those who may have benefited from the system’s weaknesses.
The unfair and poorly thought-out licensing procedures risk creating an oversupplied market (which some may argue is already past saturation point) where more licensed agents compete for the same opportunities, inevitably driving down commission rates (even with a cap) and intensifying competition for survival.
This market ‘flooding’ doesn’t elevate professional standards, it accelerates a ‘race to the bottom’ that makes it increasingly difficult for agents ‘to survive, let alone thrive‘.
The result is a self-reinforcing cycle of suffocation that achieves the very obsolescence that a more deliberate elimination strategy might accomplish, but with the added benefit of appearing to be market-driven rather than regulatory design.
The 2025 FFAR Examination 'Watershed'
Although previous sittings of the FFAR exam have received criticism and the format and structure of the exam has been widely criticised for being such things as unfair, poor, and lacking credibility, the 2025 examination represented a watershed moment that has prompted me to document these considerations (many of which I have pondered for a few years now).
That is because this year’s 2025 exam was the first fully online, annual examination conducted from candidates’ chosen location, independent of any onsite invigilation. This development was positioned as progress. Instead, it has become emblematic of the problematic implementation of FFAR.
It is widely reported that technical issues plagued the process globally. Candidates reported being unable to access examinations, facing software problems that consumed crucial examination time, encountering incorrect marking, and receiving alleged inconsistent treatment by FIFA. Some have been permitted re-sits or offered refunds, whilst others now face a year-long wait for the next examination.
More concerning than the technical failures, however, has been FIFA’s response. The organisation’s silence on these issues, their continued scripted narratives, and their apparent reluctance to engage meaningfully with affected candidates suggest either profound incompetence or deliberate indifference.
This creates a vicious cycle: frustrated candidates may never return to attempt licensing, those deterred from the licensed path often operate unlicensed, and inconsistent examinations risk licensing unsuitable candidates, whilst excluding capable ones. The examination system now appears to be a ‘tick box’ exercise for FIFA, designed to frustrate others rather than fairly assess competence.
For someone who has long believed FIFA could eventually roll back FFAR’s mistakes and repair the damage (albeit with increasing difficulty over time), this latest chapter has made such recovery difficult to envisage, even with substantial expense and effort.
The reputational damage to the FFAR and the licensing process itself may now be irreversible.
The Cascading Damage Effect
The implications of a poorly regulated football agent industry extend far beyond the agents themselves. When standards deteriorate and professionalism erodes, the consequences ripple throughout the football ecosystem. Players and coaches suffer from inadequate representation, often finding themselves vulnerable to exploitation or poorly advised on career decisions. Clubs face disrupted transfer business, with deals falling through due to incompetent handling of agent affairs or squad planning compromised by unprofessional intermediaries.
This cascade effect isn’t accidental; it’s the predictable outcome of systematic erosion of standards, and it provides the very evidence FIFA would need to justify more radical intervention in the future; the perfect justification for FIFA to ‘reinvent the wheel’ with a solution that arguably serves broader objectives.
Those at the top, larger operators and multi-agency groups, would likely survive through their ability to generate substantial commercial commissions from elite clients and also absorb operational costs due to their size. Yet individual practitioners and smaller football agency operations would face greater challenges, perfectly serving a repositioning strategy (e.g. reducing agent numbers) whilst maintaining plausible deniability.
The Strategic Value of Managed Decline
Consider what FIFA might gain from allowing controlled deterioration of current industry standards. Short-term chaos creates long-term opportunities for those positioned to provide solutions. If the current agent landscape becomes sufficiently problematic, FIFA could position itself as the necessary stabilising force rather than just an overarching international regulator.
The 2015 shift to RWWI (FIFA Regulations on Working with Intermediaries) provides a relevant precedent. The abandonment of the Player Agent licensing system at that time stripped away FIFA licensing, examinations, and client protections, prompting a flood of ‘intermediaries’ and arguably lowering standards significantly. Was this a genuine regulatory failure or a strategic decision to demonstrate the consequences of insufficient oversight?
By creating conditions that encourage unlicensed activity whilst licensing potentially substandard candidates, the ongoing problems with the current FFAR mechanism(s) ensure continued reputational damage. Many problems that emerged from FFAR and its implementation were raised with FIFA from 2018 onwards, by many people, and at many times thereafter, yet FIFA proceeded regardless of these warnings.
The Enforcement Vacuum
For more than 20 years, inconsistent regulation and enforcement by FIFA (and others) on agent regulatory matters have contributed to industry challenges and problems. The current FFAR continues this pattern. Many FFAR concepts have been defeated in courts, with numerous challenges still pending.
Most tellingly, the regulatory landscape has become fractured and contradictory. Some regulations apply in certain territories but not others, with FIFA licensing itself inconsistently applicable across jurisdictions. This creates chaos for agents, clubs, players, and national associations, further damaging industry credibility.
Added to this, there is a growing perception that FIFA cannot enforce many existing FFAR regulations, as demonstrated recently in CAS proceedings regarding unlicensed agent activity.
If FIFA genuinely wanted effective regulation, would they create such confusion? Or does this serve a different purpose entirely?
The Alternative Narrative – ‘Redistribution’ & ‘Transparency’
FIFA employs redistribution of transfer fees, compensation, and solidarity payments as a key justification for FFAR and the capping of agent commissions. Combined with initiatives like the FIFA clearing house, this suggests that whilst cultivating an image of ‘transparency’, FIFA may be seeking greater control over transfer market mechanisms and transaction flows.
Even if the ECJ/CJEU rules against FFAR, FIFA may have achieved its objective through reputational damage and industry erosion, and fragmentation. Meanwhile, players remain largely oblivious to these changes, and clubs are confused by regulatory complexity. The chaos serves a potential repositioning agenda perfectly.
It is also worth considering that even if FIFA is victorious at the ECJ/CJEU; this too would result in continued inconsistencies and chaos surrounding FFAR, given the limited jurisdiction of an EU ruling.
The Essential Element
The fundamental truth remains: agents are the oil in football’s transfer engine, maintaining and lubricating the elements that very few like to touch but which represent a necessity in any well-functioning system. They perform tasks that largely nobody else wants to examine, touch, or handle.
Alternatives to football agents exist, but many will carry undesirable consequences. You can change the oil, but not with an unsuitable alternative, as it will likely damage the engine.
The Critical Questions
The football industry must confront these uncomfortable possibilities; let’s return to our central question with the weight of evidence now considered:
Does FIFA genuinely want effective football agent regulation, or are they positioning themselves to reshape and control a lucrative industry?
Are the systemic failures we’ve witnessed evidence of inefficiency, or are they the predictable outcome of a deliberate repositioning strategy?
If FIFA wanted to marginalise many football agents whilst maintaining plausible deniability, would they act any differently than they have?
I recognise that some may view these questions as conspiracy theorising, and that’s a fair criticism. However, the pattern of evidence suggests these theories deserve serious consideration. The current trajectory indicates that certain individuals related to FIFA may be content to watch the current football agent industry model’s credibility erode entirely, and see their own FFAR project ‘thrown under the bus’ ….. knowing they’re positioned to benefit.
From this, several concerning possibilities emerge:
- FIFA may abandon agent regulation once again, claiming external forces prevented success, before later introducing a 'reformed' system that better serves its interests.
- The industry may evolve into one controlled by corporate entities utilising licensed agents as freelancers, with FIFA exercising greater oversight in a more consolidated industry with shared corporate goals and interests.
Whether through design or circumstance, the result remains the same: a system that serves nobody’s interests except perhaps those who seek to reshape it in their image and for their benefit.
The question facing the football industry is whether it will recognise this possibility before irreversible change occurs, or whether it will continue down a path that may ultimately achieve what some connected to FIFA and living in various ‘ivory towers’ across football may desire: a world where football agents are deemed obsolete, or that they only exist in a form that serves broader commercial and political objectives of FIFA and others.